SOME REMARKS ON MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S PATH OF QUESTIONING TECHNOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY


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Aktay Y.

Selçuk Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, vol.0, no.12, pp.167-184, 1998 (Other Refereed National Journals)

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 0 Issue: 12
  • Publication Date: 1998
  • Title of Journal : Selçuk Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi
  • Page Numbers: pp.167-184

Abstract

SOME REMARKS ON MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S PATH OF QUESTIONING TECHNOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

 Year 1998, Volume 0, Issue 12, 167 - 184, 13.02.2016

Yasin AKTAY 

Abstract

Heidegger's treatment of technology and his venture of the way to or from phenomenology seems at first sight irrelevant to each other. My initial aim in this study is to draw attention to their relevances in order to make some other questions about Heidegger's special path of thinking on some issues such as logocentrism, metaphysics of presence, which would ıater be promoted as a central problem of the Western humanism by Derrida and other poststructuralist thinkers. 1 will try to open the gate before such a thesis that Heidegger's criticism of or his well-known "way from" phenomenology is very akin to his criticism of technology. As will be elaborated below, technology is taken asa ~asic mood of the Being. it is the concealment of the Being which excludes any subjective human initiation. Although what makes the concealment of the Being as technology possible is man's delusion of taking _something present-at-his-hand, that is his
delusion of subjectivity, the fundamental principle of the Ca,:tesian dualism, this takes place without the subjective performance of man. The concealment of the Being is a global process which involves man's . participation just in the form of his forgetting of the Being. The concealment of the Being, like its unconcealment or revealing, is a process beyond man's limited world. Undoubtedly, here the challenge of Heidegger to the idea of subject or to the Cartesian dualism has very close ties with or roots in some religious ideas. in spite of all his objections to .Christian theological conception, 1 will try to show that, as much as I can in the limits of this study, . such Heidegger's pessimistic conceptions excluding any subjective initiatio~.
have their roots in the Christian idea of original sin. And to avoid some ~isconceptions ı should remind that this is a paradoxical connection, because Heidegger charges all the responsibility of the Cartesian idea of subject to the Christian notion of the World mastery, of the representation of God in the World. Notwithstanding, Heidegger, rejecting any version of voluntarism in the movements of the Being, in fact, follows Spinoza's pantheism which had arisen by way ofa radical criticism to Descartes. To be conscious of the range of his references, it should be kept in mind that this path of Heidegger's thinking reproduce some mystical traditions going beyond Christianity or Judaism (through Spinoza), such as paganisrp and some other Asian religions.