In this article, I analyze Fichte’s understanding of self-consciousness and discuss whether it could be regarded as a subject of scientific research. Our first goal is to explicate the Fichteian self-consciousness and to deepen our understanding of the concept of consciousness. The second one is to clarify certain aspects of Fichteian notion of consciousness that have been ignored by scientific studies on consciousness. To these ends, I examine the concept of immediate consciousness which is a fundamental element of Fichteian understanding of self-consciousness; examine the logical, ethical and intersubjective aspects of self-consciousness; and determine the intersection point of these different aspects. This point indicates becoming conscious of free self-activity, which is also the foundation of Fichte’s system. Since this consciousness of freedom is based upon immediate consciousness, I claim that from the Fichteian perspective, self-consciousness cannot be a subject of scientific research, which operates indirectly. In conclusion, I argue that i) there is a discrepancy between Fichte’s immediate consciousness and his philosophical reflection which brings about an explanation of self-consciousness; ii) since science, from the Fichteian point of view, agrees to be determined when it examines consciousness, it falls short of explaining freedom of consciousness.