CAN AL-GHAZ¯A L¯I 'S CONCEPTION of MODALITY PROPOSE A SOLUTION to ROWE'S ARGUMENT against DIVINE FREEDOM?
Res Philosophica, cilt.98, sa.2, ss.331-351, 2021 (AHCI, Scopus)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Derleme
- Cilt numarası: 98 Sayı: 2
- Basım Tarihi: 2021
- Doi Numarası: 10.11612/resphil.2043
- Dergi Adı: Res Philosophica
- Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Arts and Humanities Citation Index (AHCI), Scopus, ATLA Religion Database, Philosopher's Index
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.331-351
- Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Adresli: Hayır
Özet
© 2021 Seyma Yazici.William L. Rowe poses a dilemma between God's freedom and essential moral goodness by arguing that God cannot satisfy the arguably accepted condition for libertarian freedom, namely, ability to do otherwise. Accordingly, if God does a morally good action A freely, then there is at least a possible world in which God refrains from doing A and thereby does the morally wrong action. And if God does a morally wrong action in one of the possible worlds, he ceases to be essentially morally perfect. I will argue that Rowe's conclusion is based on a specific possible world semantics, and we might avoid Rowe's conclusion with an alternative understanding of modality. In doing so, I will examine the conception of modality proposed by al-Ghaz¯ al¯i in which the possibility of a state of affairs does not entail its actuality in at least one possible world.