This study examines Linda Zagzebski’s “exemplarist moral theory”, which is based on exemplars of moral goodness and presented as a new ethical theory alternative to deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics. Zagzebski attempts to provide all the conceptual and theoretical background for presentation of this theory as a new theory. This theory, which purports to be a plausible proposal for our ethical understanding, is presented by Zagzebski supported by a “theory of the theory” and a “theory of direct reference” from Putnam and Kripke. Rather than presenting particular virtues as character traits, his theory expresses a new view of morality grounded in direct reference to particular moral exemplars themselves, which are considered “paradigmatically good”. Zazgsebski’s theory does not offer an explanation of concepts such as “virtue”, “right action”, “duty”, “a good end”, etc., which seem essential for a moral theory. Instead, it represents an unorthodox attempt to justify all the concepts and types of actions that need to be explained morally by attributing them directly to the moral exemplars themselves. This article focuses on Zagzebski's exemplarist moral theory, as a contribution to virtue ethics as a guide to action. It emphasises that his theory is an integral part of virtue ethics, since it is the virtues themselves that make moral exemplars good examples of moral goodness.