Dinç G., Şimşek S. S.
SIIRT ÜNIVERSITESI SOSYAL BILIMLER ENSTITÜSÜ DERGISI, cilt.14, sa.1, ss.273-291, 2026 (Hakemli Dergi)
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Yayın Türü:
Makale / Tam Makale
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Cilt numarası:
14
Sayı:
1
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Basım Tarihi:
2026
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Doi Numarası:
10.53586/susbid.1899090
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Dergi Adı:
SIIRT ÜNIVERSITESI SOSYAL BILIMLER ENSTITÜSÜ DERGISI
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Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler:
Academic Search Ultimate (EBSCO), Central & Eastern European Academic Source (CEEAS), MLA - Modern Language Association Database, Directory of Open Access Journals, MLA International Bibliography
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Sayfa Sayıları:
ss.273-291
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Açık Arşiv Koleksiyonu:
AVESİS Açık Erişim Koleksiyonu
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Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Adresli:
Evet
Özet
A small number of private digital platform companies have acquired governance authority that formally belongs to democratic institutions. The mode of operation and the extent of this platform authority is influenced by the institutional configuration and regulatory traditions of the contexts in which it is exercised. This study examines how concentrated platform authority operates across two digital domains, namely cloud infrastructure and AI governance in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Drawing on oligarchy theory, Science and Technology Studies, and Castelfranchi’s theory of tutelary relationships, three mechanisms through which platform authority operates under post-democratic conditions are identified which are infrastructural embedding, epistemic capture, and imaginative stabilization. Through qualitative comparative case study analysis of primary policy documents, regulatory frameworks, and governance texts, the study traces how these mechanisms operate across all three contexts with different intensities and outcomes. The analysis demonstrates that the effectiveness of these mechanisms is determined by institutional design, regulatory tradition, and governance design choices. The findings show that the EU’s binding legal framework partially constrains platform authority, the US constitutes the most vulnerable context due to its dependence on knowledge generated by digital platforms and the UK exhibits a hybrid model based on voluntary cooperation. The study argues that structural dependence of public governance on platform companies across all three contexts undermines democratic accountability and produces paternalistic tutelary relationships, and that preserving democratic governance in digital infrastructures depends on institutional independence and the cultivation of alternative digital governance imaginaries.